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COMMENT
QUASI IN REM ON THE HEELS OF SHAFFER v.HEITNER:
IF INTERNATIONAL SHOE FITS ...
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law of state court personal jurisdiction has remained relatively stable
in the three decades since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,I which created the due process
standard for a state court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction 2 over nonresident defendants. That standard required that the defendant have "certain
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "3 The
decision, however, did not reach other bases of jurisdiction such as in rem,
quasi in rem, or physical presence. 4 The defendant's physical presence within
a state still subjected him to in personam jurisdiction, even when he had no
other contacts with the state.5 The due process standard for the exercise of in
rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction continued to require merely that the court
obtain power over the subject property by prior attachment and that the
nonresident defendant be notified of the proceeding by publication or, if
available, by means better calculated to give notice. 6 In the case of in rem
jurisdiction, since the court's authority was based on its power over the
defendant's property, it could adjudicate only claims to that property.' No
personal judgment could be rendered against the defendant himself. 8 Quasi in
rem jurisdiction was a hybrid basis of personal jurisdiction which gave the
court authority to adjudicate personal claims although the court initially had
1.

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

2. For the purposes of this Comment, a distinction is made between the terms "personal
jurisdiction" and "in personam jurisdiction." The latter is a species of the former. Personal
jurisdiction, as distinct from subject matter jurisdiction, refers to a court's power to adjudicate
the interests of a particular defendant, whether those interests be personal or related to some
property. In personam jurisdiction, as distinct from in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, refers to
the authority to adjudicate personal clalms based on the court's power over the defendant's person.
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958); Restatement of Judgments ch. 1.
Introductory Note (1942). See also notes 7-13 infra and accompanying text.
3. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
4. Id. The Court's holding was limited to the standard for in personam jurisdiction, and
seemingly excepted the application of the doctrine if the defendant were "present within the
territory of the forum." Id. at 316.
5. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 27-28 (1971).
6. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Harris v. Balk,
198 U.S. 215 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175
Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900); Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 57 (1971); Developments in the Law-State-CourtJurisdiction, 73 Ha'v. L. Rev. 909,
950-51 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
7. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 73(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
8. Id. § 73(b).
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power only over the defendant's property. 9 Lacking initial power over the
defendant's person,' 0 the court could enforce the personal claim only by
application of the property attached to the satisfaction of the resulting
personal judgment.I Consequently, in both quasi in rem and in rem jurisdiction, the defendant's liability was limited to the value of the property. 12 This
limitation has traditionally justified grounding the court's jurisdiction on less
than the in personam due process standard set forth in InternationalShoe. 13
Since International Shoe, many commentators have urged that its jurisdictional principles be applied to those doctrines that it did not touch.' 4 A
fundamental criticism of the lesser due process standard for in rem and quasi
in rem jurisdiction arose from the idea that "[a]ll proceedings . . .are really
against persons."' 5 In the case of quasi in rein jurisdiction, particularly, the
value of the property applied to satisfy the personal claim could be high
enough to effectively nullify the distinction between in personam and quasi in
rem as to the extent of the defendant's liability.16 Therefore, the commentators reasoned, if judgments resulting from quasi in rem or in rem jurisdiction are essentially in personam, the in personam due process standard should
be applied to all bases of personal jurisdiction. 17 Nevertheless, the courts,
with few exceptions,' have consistently imposed the traditional classification
of actions as in personam, in rem or quasi in rem to determine the due process
standard in any given case. 19
9. Id. §§ 73(a), 75. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Supreme Court succinctly
outlined the classification of actions for jurisdictional purposes as follows: "A judgment its
personam imposes a personal liability or obligation on one person in favor of another. A judgment
in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property. A judgment quasi in rem affects
the interests of particular persons in designated property The latter is of two types. In one the
plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to extinguish or
establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks
to apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim
against him." 357 U.S. at 246 n.12.
10. Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction:Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 St. John's L.
Rev. 668, 676 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Zammit].

11. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 73(b), 75(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
12. See, e.g., Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 188 (1886). See also notes 2, 9 supra.
13. See, e.g., Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. at 138.
14. Ehrenzweig, The TransientRule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power" Myth and Forut
Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]; von Mehren & Trautman,
JurisdictionTo Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as von Mehren & Trautman]; Developments, supra note 6, at 918.
15.

Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814, appeal dismissed, 179

U.S. 405 (1900).
16. See note 106 infra.
17. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex, L. Rev. 657, 663 (1959); Zammit,
supra note 10, at 676; Developments, supra note 6, at 954.
18. See, e.g., Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1133 (3d Cir. 1976); Atkinson v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub norm.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
19. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 245-46 (1958); ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple
Films, Ltd., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 350 N.E.2d 899, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1976).
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Aside from further elaboration and expansion of the minimum contacts
test,20 the traditional jurisdictional classification remained intact until the
Supreme Court handed down its sweeping decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.2 1 In
that shareholder's derivative action brought originally in the Delaware Court
of Chancery, the plaintiff obtained "quasi in rem" jurisdiction over individual
corporate fiduciaries by sequestering their capital stock in the defendant
to be located in Delaware
corporations. 22 By statute, that stock was deemed
23
for purposes of attachment or sequestration.
In reversing the Delaware Supreme Court, which had sustained jurisdiction
as a proper exercise of the quasi in rem procedure, the Court held that the
minimum contacts standard of InternationalShoe is henceforth to be applied
to all assertions of state court personal jurisdiction made on the basis of the
traditional in rem or quasi in rem doctrines.2 4 The Court found further that
20. See, e.g., Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426. 432, 208 N.E.2d 439. 441-42.
260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (1965) (maintaining bank account and office to engage in publicity work in
New York constitutes sufficient minimum contacts); ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Lennon, 52 App.
Div. 2d 435, 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (1976) (where defendant is "doing business" in New
York, jurisdiction is not limited "to claims arising from such business in the State")
21. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
22. Id. at 2572.
23. Id. at 2573. Del. Code tit. 8, § 169 (1974) provides: "For all purposes of title, action.
attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts held in this State, but not for the purpose
of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the
laws of this State, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this
State."
24. 97 S. CL at 2584-85. Justice Powell and Justice Stevens each concurred separately in the
judgment, id. at 2587, and Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part, id. at 2588.
Interestingly, the Court chose to consider only the contention that the exercise of jurisdiction in
the absence of minimum contacts among the forum, the defendants, and the controversy was a
violation of the due process clause. Id. at 2572. This choice on the part of the Court is noteworthy
because the case might have been decided on the notice and hearing issue if the Court had chosen
to settle the controversies raised by Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), and later decisions.
In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court, in dictum, cited Ounbey for the proposition
that an "attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court-clearly a most basic and
important public interest," id. at 91 n.23, is an "extraordinary situation" that justifies the
postponement of notice and hearing, id. at 90 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379
(1971)). Accord, Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). The Delaware
Supreme Court, in Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1976), upheld its
sequestration statute on the basis of this line of cases despite the statute's failure to provide for
notice and immediate postseizure hearing.
In Ownbey, the only issue raised was the constitutionality of requiring a defendant whose
property had been seized pursuant to a jurisdictional attachment statute to post a security bond as
a precondition to entering an appearance. Personal jurisdiction was never questioned. 256 U.S. at
102-03. The defendant contended that he had been deprived of his opportunity to be heard when
his appearance and pleadings were stricken for failure to file the bond. The Court found no denial
of due process. It refused to overturn the attachment statute's bond requirement simply because
the defendant could not pay. Id. at 110. This one-time situation was deemed by later cases to be
extraordinary so as to permit the court to dispense with the hearing. Ounbey should not be read,
however, to hold that attachment as used to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction is always an
"extraordinary situation" such that notice and hearing may always be postponed. Note, Quasi in
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neither the statutory situs of the stock nor the defendants' positions as
corporate fiduciaries constituted
sufficient contacts to support the jurisdiction
25
of the Delaware courts.
Now that the same due process standard must apply to all types of
actions, 2 6 the classification of personal jurisdiction is no longer necessary to
determine which due process standard to use. If the minimum contacts
standard is not otherwise satisfied, the presence of a nonresident's property
within the forum state, in and of itself, no longer supports the exercise of
valid jurisdiction over him. 27 However, Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, conceded that "the presence of the defendant's property in a State
might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and
the litigation .... ,,28
This means that the location of property within the
forum state, although the defendant's only manifest and identifiable contact
there, will, even under the Shaffer analysis, support the exercise of jurisdiction over him in certain circumstances. 29 Furthermore, since the in personam
due process standard is now the test for all types of personal jurisdiction,
there appears to be no basis for limiting the resulting judgment to the value of
the res that forms the requisite nexus with the state, 30 except perhaps in
31
unique factual situations.

The primary question then becomes: under what circumstances may a
nonresident defendant be compelled to defend an action in a state where,
before Shaffer, he was subject only to quasi in rem jurisdiction, with its
attendant limited liability, because his only relationship with the state arose
from the ownership of assets? This Comment will attempt to answer this
question by applying tests analogous to those heretofore viewed as determinative of in personam jurisdiction to assess the defendant's contacts with a
particular state in actions that previously would have been classified as quasi
in rem. The Shaffer opinion, unfortunately, leaves much unsaid in this

Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 Yale L.J. 1023, 1026, 1028-32 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Quasi in Rem]. Moreover, the Court in Shaffer questioned Ownbeys
continuing consistency with more recent interpretations of the due process clause. 97 S. Ct. at
2575 n.10. Thus, the Court might have limited Ownbey to its facts and overturned the Delaware
sequestration statute for its failure to provide adequate notice and hearing. In this way the Court
might have avoided a complete restructuring of jurisdictional thinking. Apparently, however, a
total overhaul of jurisdictional concepts was precisely what the Court had in mind.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 2585-87.
26. Id. at 2584-85.
27. Id. at 2582-83.
28. Id. at 2582.
29. Id. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring), 2588 (Stevens, J., concurring); O'Connor v. Lee-Hy
Paving Corp., No. 75 C 1853, slip op. at 7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1977).
30. See notes 12-13 & 15-17 supra and accompanying text. There is a school of thought that
would maintain quasi in rem jurisdiction with the judgment limited to the value of the res
attached, but with the added requirement of minimum contacts. However, when jurisdiction Is
based on minimum contacts, a limited appearance is not logically required.
31. See notes 250-54 infra and accompanying text.
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regard.3 2 To aid in the understanding of these tests, Shaffer and the developments leading to it will first be examined. 3 3 Second, the factors to be
considered in determining personal jurisdiction based on the ownership of
tangible property will be developed. 34 These factors will then be applied to
three types of intangible personalty that were often the subject of quasi in
rem attachment- simple debts, capital stock, and insurance policies. 3S Finally,
36
further implications suggested by the Shaffer opinion will be discussed.
"I. THE

Shaffer BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
A. Prior Developments

Constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction prior to Shaffer derived
initially from Pennoyer v. Neff, 3 7 which established a territorial basis' of
jurisdiction resting on two principles of public law: "One of these principles
is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory .... The other principle. . . is, that
no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory." 38 In an action in ejectment brought by Neff, a
nonresident of Oregon, to recover property which he owned there and which
had been sold to satisfy a judgment in a prior action against him, the Court
held the prior judgment invalid and restored Neff to the possession of his
property. The basis for the Court's decision was that the Oregon court in the
prior action had neither in personam jurisdiction over Neff, since he was not
present in the state at the time, nor jurisdiction over his property, since it had
39
not been brought before the court by prior attachment.
The effects of Pennoyer were twofold. First, it required personal service
upon a defendant within the state in order to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over him. 40 Second, nonresident defendants thereafter could be subjected to
jurisdiction only if the forum had power over some property of the defendant
that was situated within the state. 41 Jurisdiction obtained by this latter
method rendered the action either in rem or quasi in rem, depending on the
nature of the claims adjudicated,4 2 and, in any event, resulting judgments
could not exceed the value of the property that provided the basis for
jurisdiction. 43 In one sense, Pennoyer afforded some protection to nonresident
defendants; on the other hand, it made available to plaintiffs any forum in
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See 97 S. CL at 2582 n.28.
See part II infra.
See part III infra.
See part IV infra.
See part V infra.
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
Id. at 722.
Id. at 734.
Id. at" 721-22.

41. Id. at 723-24.

42. See notes 2, 6-13, 19 supra and accompanying text.
43. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187-88 (1886). See generally Developments, supra
note 6, at 948-50.
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whose territory the defendant's property was located. 44 Although Pennoyer
made the situs of property and the physical presence of the defendant critical
factors in finding state court jurisdiction, the decision failed to establish any
criteria for their determination. Later cases therefore created certain legal
fictions to deal with this problem.
The first question to be resolved by the court in any quasi in rem proceeding
is whether, in fact, the subject property is located, or has its situs, within the
boundaries of the forum state. 45 This determination presents no problem in
the case of real property or tangibles, but locating the situs of intangible
personalty (a debt, for example), especially when it is not embodied in any
sort of writing, is more difficult. 46 The Supreme Court resolved the problem of
a debt's situs in Harris v. Balk, 47 when it held that a debt owed to a
defendant could be attached for the purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction in
any forum in which in personam jurisdiction could be exercised over the
defendant's debtor.48 Hence, a major fiction in the realm of quasi in rem
proceedings was constructed in order to accommodate Pennoyer's two principles of public law 49 and at the same time expand the plaintiff's ability to bring
nonresident defendants into court.50
With respect to in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations, similar
fictions had been developed even before the advent of Pennoyer and were
perpetuated thereafter. As early as 1856, the Court, in Lafayette Insurance
Co. v. French,5 1 had deemed a foreign corporation doing business in a state to
have "consented" to being sued there. After Pennoyer, the doing businessconsent doctrine was transformed into a fictional notion of presence. 2 Eventually, the law developed on the basis of this fiction to a point where a
corporation could be sued without violation of the due process clause in any
44.

97 S. Ct. at 2578; Zammit, supra note 10, at 670.

45. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 221-22 (1905). See generally Andrews, Situs oflntangibles
in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 Yale L.J. 241 (1939); Beale, The Exercise of
Jurisdiction in Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 107, 113-14 (1913)
[hereinafter cited as Beale].
46. Zamrnmit, supra note 10, at 671; Developments, supra note 6, at 951-53; see Atkinson v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 342, 316 P.2d 960, 963 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied
sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) ("Being an
intangible, it has no situs in fact."); commentaries cited note 14 supra.
47.

198 U.S. 215 (1905).

48.

Id. at 222; accord, Louisville & N.R.R. v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176 (1906); Steele v. G.D.

Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974).

49.
50.

See text accompanying note 38 supra.
E.g., 97 S. Ct. at 2578; Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 290; Zammit, supra note 10, at

670.

51. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
52. See Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915
(1917). In 1930, Judge Learned Hand recognized the purely fictional nature of equating doing
business with presence in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
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state where it was incorporated,
was qualified to do business, or was actually
53
transacting business.
As society became increasingly mobile, 54 courts also applied these presence
and consent fictions to nonresident individuals. 5 5 The most notable case in
this development was Hess v. Pawloski,5 6 where the Court approved a
Massachusetts nonresident motor vehicle statute that deemed any nonresident
to have "impliedly consented" to the appointment of the secretary of state as
agent for service of process in connection with any suit arising out of the
nonresident's use of Massachusetts highways. This substituted service was
57
held sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.
Another major outgrowth of the Pennoyer rules became settled in 1940 with
the decision in Milliken v. Meyer,58 where the Court held that "[d]omicile in
the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of
of a personal judgment by means of
the state's jurisdiction for purposes
' 9
appropriate substituted service."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
By the time this extensive fictional framework for personal jurisdiction was
fully developed, Pennoyer had outgrown much of its usefulness in protecting
defendants from suit in a distant forum. 60 The numerous theories developed
by courts to establish their power over the defendant-presence, actual
consent, domicile, and implied consent-led in some cases to outlandish
results. 6 1 In most instances, however, courts made quantitative evaluations of
defendants' activities within the state to determine whether the doing
so doing, the courts expended an
business-presence fictions applied, 62 but in
63
inordinate amount of "judicial energy.1
B.

53. See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Developments, supra note
6, at 919-23; cases cited note 52 supra.
54. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957), cites the "fundamental
transformation of our national economy" as the reason for the relaxation of jursidictional
restrictions.
55. See id.; Developments, supra note 6, at 917-18.
56.

274 U.S. 352 (1927).

57. Id.; cf. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953) (approving the implied
consent theory of Hess v. Pawloski as applied to nonresident motorists but affirming dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds).
58. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
59. Id. at 462.
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2580; Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 309-12.
61. In Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), for example, the court used
the presence fiction to sustain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who was served with
process while he was a passenger on an aircraft flying over Arkansas. See Ehrenzweig, supra note
14, at 289-90.
62. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v.
Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 224-28 (1913).
63. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2579. See generally 326 U.S. at 317-19.
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In International Shoe, the Court attempted, inter alia, to simplify these
matters as it recognized that
[t]o say that the corporation is so far "present" [in the state] as to satisfy due process
requirements . . . is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or

"presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of
due process. . . . Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with
the state of the forum as make it reasonable 64. . . to require the corporation to defend

the particular suit which is brought there.

Although these words of Chief Justice Stone appear on their face to be merely
new terminology for practices already developed by the courts, 65 the tests for
determining minimum contacts were altered as well. Rather than inquiring
into the number of activities in the forum state, the courts were to focus
instead on "the quality and nature of the [defendant's] activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration" of the state's laws 66 Thus, International
Shoe recognized that the fictions used to support in personam jurisdiction
were simply legal conclusions that the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable, 67 and replaced the several fictions with a single standard of reasonableness. 68 The Court did not enumerate the factors for determining whether the
assumption of jurisdiction was reasonable under the circumstances,6 9 but
instead set forth the broad minimum contacts standard-a standard providing
sufficient latitude to encompass a number of factual situations without the
need to count the defendant's activities within the state or to pigeon-hole them
under one of the prior fictions. 70 One effect of InternationalShoe, then, was
to reduce substantially Pennoyer's vitality with respect to in personam jurisdiction. 71 Territorial boundaries were no longer the foremost consideration;
rather, the test focused on the relationship among the defendant, the controversy, and the forum. 7 2 The physical presence doctrine was the only major
73
basis derived from Pennoyer for in personam jurisdiction to remain.
64. 326 U.S. at 316-17 (citing Judge Learned
45 F.2d 139, 141 (1930)).
65. Developments, supra note 6, at 923.
66. 326 U.S. at 319.
67. Id. at 316-17.
68. Id.
69. Developments, supra note 6, at 924.

Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.,

70. In International Shoe, the reasonableness test was satisfied because the defendant
corporation's activities in Washington were continuous and were a source of great revenue and
because the underlying controversy arose out of those activities. 326 U.S. at 320.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 2580; Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 309-12.
72. 97 S. Ct. at 2580; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316. In Shqffer the
Court noted that territorial boundaries continue to have significance, but only to the extent that
"States are defined by their geographical territory." 97 S. Ct. at 2580 n.20. The boundaries are
useful only in determining whether a defendant has contacts with one state as opposed to another.
Id.; see Smit, The Enduring Utility of in Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43
Brooklyn L. Rev. 600, 600 n.5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Smit].
73. See notes 4, 5, 61 supra and accompanying text.
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Subsequent developments regarding in personam jurisdiction did not depart
significantly from the InternationalShoe test. In later cases, jurisdiction was
upheld in suits where a corporation's out-of-state activities had consequences
within the forum state, 74 or where the controversy arose out of obligations
created by a single act in the state, 7 5 or where the cause of action was
unrelated to the corporation's activities in the state so long as they were of
such a "substantial and continuing" nature that compelling the nonresident
defendant to defend in that forum was fair and reasonable. 7 6 Although some
courts continued to rely on quantitative measures, 7 7 other later decisions
turned on the existence of "some act by which the defendant purposefully
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.

78

As Justice Marshall pointed out in Shaffer, no change as "dramatic" as that
brought by International Shoe occurred in the areas of in rem and quasi in
rem jurisdiction. 79 However, one subsequent Supreme Court decision and a
few lower court decisions set the stage for Shaffer's reevaluation of the in rem
rules derived from Pennoyer and Harris.80
The lower court decisions, in dealing with the problems associated with the
situs of intangibles, found that a departure from the territoriality concept was
unavoidable and that balancing the interests of the defendant, the plaintiff,
and the state was a more effective tool for deciding modern jurisdictional
questions.8 1 In Atkinson v. Superior Court,82 for example, Justice Traynor
discarded the situs theory derived from Harris and held that the solution to
74. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.. 22 IUl. 2d 432. 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
75. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Feathers v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d
548 (1964), reversed on other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
76. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Beja v. Jahangiri,
453 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1972). This actually became a permissible basis for jurisdiction long before
International Shoe. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
77. E.g., Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955); Berk v. Gordon
Johnson Co., 212 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Republic Supply Corp. v. Lewyt Corp., 160
F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Mich. 1958); Willett v. Union Pac. R.R., 76 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
78. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253.
79. 97 S. Ct. at 2580. In fact, the New York Court of Appeals considered "situs" to be a
determinative factor in upholding quasi in rem jurisdiction in a recent case, ABKCO Indus., Inc.
v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 350 N.E.2d 899, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1976).
80. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); U.S. Indus., Inc. v.
Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2972 (1977); Bekins v. Huish, I Ariz. App.
258, 401 P.2d 743 (1965); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957). appeal
dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569
(1958); Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976).
81. See, e.g., von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1164; Developments, supra note 6,
at 956.
82. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
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the question of jurisdiction over a New York trustee of certain royalties and
other payments claimed by the California plaintiffs "must be sought in the
general principles governing jurisdiction over persons and property .
"8...
3
These general principles entailed an evaluation of the "bearing that local
'8 4
contacts have to the question of over-all fair play and substantial justice.
Justice Traynor's reasoning put into question the proposition that a state may
adjudicate rights to property solely on the basis of its location in the state
despite the absence of any relationship between the forum and the controversy
or the property's owner."In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 8 6 the Supreme Court
found the classification of actions as in personam or in rem "so elusive and
confused" that it could not form a dependable basis on which to decide cases
involving fourteenth amendment rights.8 7 Mullane involved an accounting by
the trustee of a common trust and the type of notice required to be given to all
interested beneficiaries. The Court held that, regardless of whether the action
were classified as in rem or in personam, the same criterion for notice had to
be met; that is, the Court required the best notice possible under the
circumstances. 88 Part of the Court's rationale grew out of the recognition that,
despite the technical classification, the proceeding was one in which persons
"may be deprived of property rights." 89 This possibility required that such
persons be given the same kind of notice required in in personam actions, if
feasible, to comport with due process standards.
C.

The Arguments for Maintaining Quasi
in Rem Jurisdiction
The basic premise of the Shaffer Court's decision, as well as the commentaries to which the court alluded, 90 was that "[t]he phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction
over the interests of persons in a thing." 9' Reasoning from this premise, the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
Justice

Id. at 345, 316 P.2d at 964.
Id., 316 P.2d at 965.
See 97 S. Ct. at 2580-81.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id. at 312.
Id. at 318-20. The Court's premise in Mullane was reminiscent of the statement by Chief
Holmes of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Tyler v. Court of Registration,

175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900): "All proceedings, like all

rights, are really against persons." Id. at 76, 55 N.E. at 814. See also Continental Grain Co. v.
Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960) ("Although the action . . . was technically brought against
the barge itself as well as its owner, the obvious fact is that, whatever other advantages may
result, this is an alternative way of bringing the owner into court.").
89.

339 U.S. at 313.

90. See, e.g., Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241,
267 [hereinafter cited as Hazard]; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1135. See also H.
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 68 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964).
91. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 56. Introductory Note (1971), quoted in
Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2581.
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Court concluded that "the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify
exercising 'jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.'
It held that
"[t]he standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the
interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum
contacts standard elucidated in InternationalShoe."93 Once the basic premise
94
is accepted, the argument is unquestionably "simple and straightforward."
If the minimum contacts standard is now the test for all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction, attachment and its analogous procedures are no
longer necessary for obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, since
the equivalent of in personam jurisdiction exists once the defendant passes the
InternationalShoe test. 95 However, as Justice Marshall noted in his opinion,
there are arguments in favor of maintaining the quasi in rem procedure. 9 6 He
considered 97
each of these arguments seriatim, but he found none of them
compelling.
The primary argument is that attachment should continue to be available
as a means of preventing a defendant from escaping a state's jurisdiction by
removing his assets to another forum where he is not subject to an in
personam judgment. 98 But, as Justice Marshall explained, because this argument looks to the reason for the property's location in a particular state, it
does not support the use of attachment to obtain jurisdiction in cases where
the debtor had not removed his property to that location to escape the court's
jurisdiction.9 9 Moreover, two procedures are still available under Shaffer to
protect against the defendant's removal or concealment of his assets to avoid
liability. First, once the debtor's obligations have been adjudicated in a forum
that has in personam jurisdiction over him, attachment procedures remain
available in any other forum where the defendant owns property for the
purpose of executing the judgment by virtue of the full faith and credit
clause. 100 Second, state courts continue to have jurisdiction to use the
provisional remedy of attachment "as security for a judgment being sought in
a forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with International Shoe."' 0 ' A recent federal district court case, in fact, construed Shaffer
",92

92. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 56. Introductory
Note (1971)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2581.
95. Id. at 2583 n.31.
96. Id. at 2583-84.
97. Id.
98. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 66, Comment a (1971), quoted in Shaffer v.
Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2583; cf. Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 302 ("IThose cases in which English
courts in fact assumed jurisdiction had substantial domestic contacts or. . . plaintiff could not
expect justice elsewhere.").
99. 97 S. CL at 2583, see Note, The Power of a State To Affect Title in a ChattelAtypically
Removed to It,47 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 785 (1947).
100. 97 S. Ct. at 2583 & n.36; see Beale, supra note 45, at 123.
101. 97 S. Ct. at 2583; see, e.g., Beale, supra note 45, at 123-24; Hazard, supra note 90, at
284-85; von Mebren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1178. This use of attachment procedures is
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to allow a California court to attach a French corporation's assets, pending a
final adjudication in an action brought elsewhere, when it was clear that the
French corporation did not have sufficient contacts with California to satisfy
10 2
the International Shoe standard for in personam jurisdiction.
A second argument discussed by Justice Marshall for maintaining the quasi
in rem procedure is that since the potential liability in such actions is limited
to the value of the property seized, compelling the defendant to enter a limited
appearance does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. 10 3 But, the Court noted in Shaffer, this "limitation does not affect the
argument." 0 4 The size of plaintiff's claim will affect the nature of the hearing
required to comport with due process limitations in attachment proceedings, 10 5 but it has no effect on the fairness of compelling a defendant's
10 6
appearance in a foreign forum.
Another argument considered by Justice Marshall was that the International Shoe standard is so uncertain and difficult to apply that the plaintiff
may not always be assured a forum in which to sue. 10 7 In answer, it should be
noted that application of the traditional quasi in rem test appears just as
difficult in many cases, as evidenced by the problems encountered in locating
the situs of the chose in action in Atkinson v. Superior Court. 10 Moreover, a
more like the original common law use in Great Britain to prevent the flight of absconding
debtors who, were the analysis applied at the time, had already met the InternationalShoe test.
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 302.
102. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, No. C-77-0123, slip op. at 7-8 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 1977). The asset was a debt owed to the corporate defendant by a California corporation, and
it arose from business done in other states. Id. at 3-4.
103. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.23, 2583 n.32; see Smit, .;upra note 72, at 625.
104. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.23; see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-90 (1972).
105. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
106. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.23, 2583 n.32; Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rent
Jurisdiction, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 303, 317 (1962). Indeed, requiring a defendant to travel great
distances to defend a small property claim seems highly unfair. Conversely, some seizures may
not result effectively in a limited appearance when the property attached has a value as high or
higher than the amount claimed. This, in fact, was the situation in Shaffer, where the total value
of the stock on the date of seizure was approximately $1.2 million. 97 S.Ct. at 2574 nn.7 & 8. It
should also be noted that the Delaware sequestration statute provided for no limited appearance,
but rather, sought to compel a general appearance subjecting the defendants to full in personam
liability. Id. at 2583; U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 156 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S.Ct. 2972 (1977); see Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 290 A.2d 693, 695 (Del.
Ch. 1972). The subject sequestration statute, Del. Code tit. 10, § 366 (1975), provides in pertinent
part: "The Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part of
his property, which property may be sold under the order of the Court to pay the demand of the
plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise defaults."
107. 97 S. Ct. at 2584; see, e.g., Hazard, supra note 90, at 283; Smit, supra note 72, at
607-08; Developments, supra note 6, at 950 & n.260. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in
Shaffer, urged the "preservation of the common law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction" in
limited circumstances because it "arguably would avoid the uncertainty of the general International Shoe standard ....
97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Powell, J.,concurring).
108. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nora.
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plaintiff is rarely limited to the forum of his residence for purposes of bringing
suit. He can almost always bring suit in the state of the defendant's residence
or in a forum of the state where the cause of action arose.) 0 9 In those limited
cases in which no other forum is available, the presence of a defendant's
property within the state may nevertheless support a finding of jurisdiction. 110
In sum, none of the arguments in favor of continuing the quasi in rem
procedure were found strong enough to outweigh the Shaffer rationale.
Ill.

TANGIBLE PROPERTY AS A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

Although Shaffer does not expressly overrule Pennoyer"I and Harris,"2

the two principal cases in the development of quasi in rem theories, it casts
grave doubt upon their continued validity. In a footnote, the Court stated its
reluctance to reconsider the two cases directly: "It would not be fruitful for us
to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the rationales of Pennoyer and
Harristo determine whether jurisdiction might have been sustained under the
standard we adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent
with this standard, they are overruled."' 13 The obvious inference to be drawn
from this statement is that the doctrines of territoriality and the fictional
location of intangible obligations are no longer relevant
factors in evaluating
4
the constitutionality of state-court jurisdiction."
The Shaffer Court did not enumerate the factors to be considered in
deciding whether the presence of property suggests other ties with the
forum;'1 s the elucidation of these factors and additional ties remains for a
case-by-case determination." 6 At the same time, the Court's statement evidences its reluctance to rule out entirely a finding of jurisdiction in all actions
that, prior to Shaffer, fit under the quasi in rem label." 7 On the contrary,
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); see notes 81-85 supra and
accompanying text.
109. Nearly all state-long arm statutes provide for jurisdiction on either of these grounds. See
statutes cited note 276 infra.
110. See Zammit, supra note 10, at 681-82; notes 158-62 infra and accompanying text.
111. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
112. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
113. 97 S. Ct. at 2585 n.39.
114. See notes 90-93 supra and accompanying text.
115. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.28.
116. McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 178 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9. 1977, at 2, col. 3. In his
concurring opinion in Shaffer, Justice Powell "explicitly reserve[d) judgment... on whether the
ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located within
a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction
within the State to the extent of the value of the property." 97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Of course, as noted above, there is no need to limit the jurisdiction to the velue of the
property since the extent of the defendant's potential liability has no bearing on the fairness of
requiring him to appear in a distant forum. See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text. Aside
from this qualification, Justice Powell's statement has substantial force.
117. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., No. 75 C 1853, slip op. at 7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
1977).
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jurisdiction will be sustained if those actions which are completely unrelated
to "the property which now serves as the basis for state court jurisdiction"
otherwise pass the International Shoe test.""1
In fact, the majority opinion agreed that the presence of certain types of
property, without more, would justify a court's authority to adjudicate in
certain circumstances.'' 9 It stated, for example, that when the underlying
controversy arises from claims to the property itself, the state where the
property is located would certainly have jurisdiction over the defendantowner on all but a very few occasions.' 20 Furthermore, jurisdiction in the
state where the property is located may also be sustained when other types of
controversies, such as personal injury or nuisance claims, arise out of the
ownership, use, or possession of the property.' 2' In fact, many long-arm
statutes encompass both of these situations. 122 Thus, it appears that jurisdiction will be upheld with but a few exceptions when the plaintiffs cause of
action is in some way connected to the property. The remaining question, left
unanswered by Shaffer, is under what circumstances a court may obtain
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on the basis of the location of his
property in the state when the controversy has no relationship to the defendant's interest in that property, but when that property suggests more in the
way of ties with the state.
To suggest guidelines for answering this question, the following discussion
will combine tests analogous to the "doing business" tests derived from
International Shoe with the interest balancing approach urged by many
commentators. 123 The interests to be examined in every case are three: those
of the defendant, those of the state, and those of the plaintiff. 124 The
defendant's primary interest is in not having to defend in a forum away from
home. The primary interests of the state are providing its resident plaintiffs
with a forum for redress and applying its law to the adjudication of the
controversy. 2- The plaintiffs interests are ordinarily coincident with those of
the state. The fairness of asserting the state's and plaintiff's interests over
those of the defendant, according to Shaffer and InternationalShoe, must be
measured by the relationships between the defendant and the state and
118.

97 S. Ct. at 2582.

119.

Id.

120. Id. These rare occasions would exist, for example, where personalty is removed to a
particular state without the owner's consent, where the removal is only temporary, or where the
owner is fraudulently induced to locate his personalty within the reach of a certain forum. See
Note, The Power of a State To Affect Title in a Chattel Atypically Removed to It, 47 Colum. L.
Rev. 767 (1947), cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.25. Circumstances such as these
do not "indicate that [the defendant] expected to benefit from the State's protection of his
interest." 97 S. Ct. at 2582 (footnote omitted).
121.

97 S. Ct. at 2582.

122.

See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-59b (West Supp. 1977); I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, §

17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302 (McKinney
123. See notes 14, 18, 81-85 supra and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Smit, supra note 72, at 608-10.

125.

See notes 148-62 infra and accompanying text.

1972 & Supp. 1976-77).
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between the state and the controversy. Where the only relationship between
the defendant and the state is an interest in property, factors which may
justify asserting jurisdiction over him include: the purposefulness and the
substantial and continuing nature of his
ties with the state and his expecta26
tions as to the likely forum for suit.
This discussion will attempt to examine each of these factors and interests
in concrete terms, and to analyze the fairness of asserting jurisdiction according to the type of property involved. 127 Tangibles and intangibles as bases for
jurisdiction will be treated separately. 28 This discussion will also show that,
despite elimination of state court jurisdiction over many traditional quasi in
rem type actions, long-arm jurisdiction based on minimum contacts may
fairly be expanded to cover
more actions in which tangible property forms the
12 9
basis for jurisdiction.
A. The Defendant-State Contacts
The purposefulness with which the defendant has placed his property in a
state has had on many occasions a significant bearing upon the fairness of
bringing the defendant into that state's courts. 30 Whether the defendant
"purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,"' 3' has
been the critical factor on which many decisions have turned since International Shoe.' 32 This factor is not necessarily determinative, 33 however,
because varying degrees of purposefulness may be found in different situations. Considerations going to the weight of this factor are: the value of
the property, the income, if any, produced by it, the 3nature
of the property
4
itself, and the duration of its location in the state.
When the defendant owns real property within a state, the purposefulness
of its location there cannot be doubted. Real property is ordinarily an asset of
great value. Its ownership or possession provides a substantial and continuing
relationship between the defendant and the state, 3 s and "would normally
indicate that [the
defendant] expected to benefit from the State's protection of
1 36
his interest."'
126. See notes 130-47 infra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 163-67 infra and accompanying text.
128. See part IV infra.
129. See part V infra.
130. Smit, supra note 72, at 621; see note 78 supra and accompanying text.
131. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
132. See, e.g., Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 167 (9th Cir. 1975);
Davis H. Elliot Co. v. Caribbean Util. Co., 513 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1975); Southern Mach.
Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968).
133. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.28.
134. Smit, supra note 72, at 620; Developments, supra note 6, at 965 n.342.
135. Smit, supra note 72, at 617-18; Note, Ownership, Possession, or Use of Property as a
Basis of in Personam Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 374, 377-78 (1959) (hereinafter cited as
Ownership].
136. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 (footnotes omitted). Justice Marshall made this statement in discussing
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With respect to personalty, a great deal depends on the value of the
property and the permanence with which it is situated in the forum state. If,
for example, a nonresident continually stored products of high value in a
warehouse within the state in order to benefit from low ad valorem property
taxes, his purposeful activity within the state should support a finding of
jurisdiction in any cause of action, whether related or unrelated to the
property itself.' 37 The same might hold true if the defendant maintained a
sizable bank account in the state for the purpose, of gaining substantial
interest revenues. Situations such as these indicate not only that the defendant
intends to avail himself of the protection of the state's laws, 138 but also that he
is reaping significant revenues from the state as a result of his purposeful
choice for the situs of his property.139 Where this is so, the defendant would
40
have established a substantial and continuing relationship with the state, of
with a substantial
the kind that should support jurisdiction if coupled
14
connection between the state and the litigation. '
Another major factor to be considered in evaluating the defendant's interests is whether he expects to be subject to the jurisdiction of the state where
actions involving claims to the defendant's property itself. However, the fact that a cause of
action is or is not related to the property should have no bearing on whether the defendant
expects to derive any benefit from the state's laws with regard to that property.
The nature of the defendant's interest in his property may also be a factor in determining the
fairness of exercising jurisdiction over him. Many state long-arm statutes provide for jurisdiction
over a nonresident if he "owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state."
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302(a)(4) (McKinney 1972). See also statutes cited note 276 ibtfra. It has
been questioned, however, whether a nonresident mortgagee or trustee has a sufficient interest in
the property to constitute a strong enough tie with the state. See Ownership, supra note 135,
380-81. Several Pennsylvania state court decisions have held that interests such as these are great
enough to constitute ownership or use. See, e.g., Chong v. Faull, 88 Pa. D. & C. 357
(Philadelphia County Ct. 1954); Jamison v. United Cigar Whelan Stores, 68 Pa. D. & C. 121
(Philadelphia County Ct. 1949); Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Philadelphia County
Ct. 1938). But unless these interests carry with them some other acts of dominion or control of the
property, 68 Pa. D. & C. at 128, the strength of the defendant's tie with the state would be
considerably less. See Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. at 70; Eisenbrey v. Pennsylvania
Co. for Ins., 141 Pa. 566, 573, 21 A. 639, 640 (1891).
137. See generally Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253; notes 130-34 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
140. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 318; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915
(1917) (jurisdiction upheld on basis of substantial and continuing activities even when cause of
action is distinct from those activities).
141. Substantial defendant-state contacts ordinarily should not support jurisdiction if the
state has no interest in the controversy. See notes 148-62 infra and accompanying text. Other
considerations to be taken into account in assessing the nature and quality of the defendant's ties
with the forum state include the inconvenience and hardship of defending in that forum and the
availability of the defendant's evidence and witnesses. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. at 317; Smit, supra note 72, at 611; Developments, supra note 6, at 965.
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his property is located. In the case of certain types of property, a finding of
purposefulness may imply that the defedant has this expectation. 4 2 As Justice
Stevens argued in his concurring opinion in Shaffer, the ownership of some
types of property "gives rise to predictable risks" of suit in another state. 43 In
addition, Justice Marshall'" and Justice Brennan 4 5 both mentioned the
expectations of the parties as to the likely forum for suit as a relevant
consideration. When the title of real estate or a personal injury on it is the
source of the underlying controversy, the defendant would very likely expect
to be subject to suit in the state where the real estate is located.' 46 However,
it should make no difference whether the cause of action is connected or
unconnected to the property in terms of the defendant's convenience and his
expectations as to the possibility of having to defend a suit in that state. 147 No
constitutional distinction between actions related to the property and actions
unrelated to it appears to render jurisdiction fair in one case and unfair in
another. The fact that an action is unrelated to the property in no way
reduces the connection between the defendant and the state that the property
itself suggests, although it may have a bearing on the strength of the
connection between the state and the litigation.
B.

The State's Interests and Plaintiff's
Need for a Forum

In evaluating the propriety of conducting the litigation in a particular state,
the tie between the state and the controversy must also be considered.' 4
Certainly, when the cause of action arises in the forum state, this relationship
is great. Analogy to the traditional common law standard for obtaining
jurisdiction over a defendant who does business within the state 49 suggests
that jurisdiction may stand, despite the lack of connection between the cause
of action and the property, provided that the defendant's ownership of
property is of a substantial and continuing nature and that the contact
between the state and the controversy is strong.1S ° Jurisdiction has been
sustained in cases where the defendant's business transactions in a state were
of such a substantial and continuing nature that compelling the defendant to
appear in that state did not offend traditional notions of fair play and
142. See Snait, supra note 72, at 621, 623; Developments, supra note 6. at 965.
143. 97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. "[A]ppellants had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court." Id. at 2586.
145. Id. at 2592 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 2582.
147. Provided that the extent to which a defendant's property ties him to the forum state is
substantial and continuing, the defendant may be subject to the jurisdiction of that state in any
cause of action, whether related or unrelated to the property. See notes 140-45 supra and
accompanying text.
148. 97 S. Ct. at 2580.
149. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
150. See Ownership, supra note 135, at 377-78; McLaughlin, Practice Commentary, N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Law § 302, at 87-88 (McKinney 1972).
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substantial justice even when the cause of action did not arise out of those
transactions.' 5 In the constitutional analysis, there is no logical reason for
distinguishing between business transactions and ownership of property as
state-defendant contacts.
The fact that the controversy originates in a particular state may, in and of2
itself, suggest that the state has an important interest in the litigation.,Justice Brennan argued in Shaffer that the applicability of the state's law is a
consideration supporting jurisdiction,' 5 3 although Justice Marshall sharply
disagreed, emphasizing the distinction made in Hanson v. Denckla between
choice of law and jurisdiction. 5 4 Some commentators, however, believe that
the applicability of the forum's law provides a legitimate state interest in the
litigation that, when combined with other factors, buttresses a finding of
jurisdiction.' -'- This is particularly true when the controversy involves legal
relationships in which a unity of administration is essential. 5 6 Choice of law
may not be as determinative a factor as Justice Brennan suggests,'"1 but once
the distinct question of whose law governs is answered, it can provide some
basis for determining the extent of the contact between the forum and the
litigation in the jurisdictional analysis.
The unavailability of another forum also strengthens the state's interest in
151. See cases cited note 149 supra.
152. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Atkinson v, Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d
338, 346-47, 316 P.2d 960, 965-66 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub norn. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
153. 97 S. Ct. at 2591 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (state law, not federal, governs); Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("[c]orporations are creatures of state law"); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) ("Such a plaintiff often may represent an important public and
stockholder interest in bringing faithless managers to book.'); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 509 (1947) (appropriate forum is one "that is at home with the state law that must govern the
case"); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (subject matter of action "peculiarly within
the regulatory power of New York, as the State of incorporation.'); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs,
237 U.S. 662 (1915) (proper court to adjudicate interests of members in a mortuary fund is that
where the corporation managing the fund is chartered).
154. 97 S. Ct. at 2586 n.45. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Court phrased
the distinction as follows: "For the purpose of applying its rule that the validity of a trust is
determined by the law of the State of its creation, Florida ruled that the appointment amounted
to a 'republication' of the original trust instrument in Florida. For choice-of-law purposes such a
ruling may be justified, but we think it an insubstantial connection with the trust agreement for
purposes of determining the question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant." Id.
at 253.
155. E.g., Smit, supra note 72, at 610-12; Developments, supra note 6, at 965.
156. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
157. "At the minimum, the decision that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws and
rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fairness of permitting that same State to accept
jurisdiction foi adjudicating the controversy." 97 S. Ct. at 2591 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part.)
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conducting the litigation in its courts.'" 8 This becomes an important factor
where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum who would probably require
public assistance if not provided with a forum for redress.' 9 Similarly,
160
and Hanson 16 1
jurisdiction should be sustained in cases like Afullane
where, insofar as unity of administration is essential, that forum is usually the
only one
available, and little or no unfairness would result to the defen162
dant.
C.

Striking the Balance

The factors discussed above lead to a jurisdictional analysis by the type of
property involved. The ownership of real property and most tangibles should
normally support jurisdiction unless the state-controversy ties are too weak.
Intangibles and some movable tangibles, on the other hand, may not provide
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction even when the state's interest in the litigation
is strong. The type of property involved, then, is a useful analytical tool, but
it is by no means a determinative factor and should not be overemphasized.
Nor is the state's interest in the controversy a critical factor. The primary
considerations appear to be the purposefulness with which the defendant
makes contact with the state and the substantial and continuing nature of that
contact.
Thus, in a jurisdictional analysis with respect to real property, the necessary tie between the defendant and the state almost always exists. 63 However, the court must still balance the state's connection with the litigation
against the inconvenience to the nonresident in defending the suit in that
state. When the cause of action arises in the state, and the state's law applies,
it appears that sufficient contacts would exist among the defendant, the
controversy, and the forum.' 64 A like result should be reached even if the
state-controversy
tie is weak but no other forum is available to the plaintiff.' 65 On the other hand, if none of these circumstances exists-that is, if the
cause of action arose out of state, and another state's law should apply, and
66
another forum is available to the plaintiff-jurisdiction should be denied,'

158. Zammit, supra note 10, at 682; Developments, supra note 6, at 965. The Shaffer Court
explicitly refused to address this question. 97 S. Ct. at 2584 n.37.
159. Smit, supra note 72, at 612; cf. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S.
66, 72-73 (1954) (choice of law); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.

532, 542-43 (1935) (same).
160. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
161. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, although Florida was the "center of gravity" in terms of
defendant-state contacts, the appropriate forum was Delaware where the trust res was located
and where the acts of the defendant trustee occurred. Id. at 254.
162. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1159-60, 1162-63.
163. See notes 135-36 supra and accompanying text.
164. Ownership, supra note 135, at 377-78.
165. Zammit, supra note 10, at 682.
166. Id.; Ownership, supra note 135, at 378; see Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1970). It should be noted, however, that the procedure created by Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 46

even if the plaintiff is a state resident and a potential welfare recipient. 167 In
the case of personalty, the state interest analysis would follow similar reasoning, but the result would differ in the case of movable tangibles only
temporarily located in the state. Intangibles, too, lack the kind of substantial
and continuing relationship with the state that would support jurisdiction,
even if contacts between the state and the controversy are relatively strong. 168
The state's relationship with the controversy should not be overemphasized
at the expense of the state's relationship with the defendant., 69 Since the
underlying goal of the Shaffer-InternationalShoe limitations on state court
70
jurisdiction is to achieve fair play and substantial justice for the defendant, 1
his ties with the state arising from his ownership of property and his
expectations as to the possibility of suit in that state should weigh more
heavily than the interests of the forum or the plaintiff in carrying on the
litigation there.'17 Furthermore, jurisdiction should be declined if the inconvenience to the defendant outweighs the interests of both the state and the
plaintiff.172
In sum, the most important factor appears to be the purposefulness with
which, and the extent to which, the defendant connects himself with the state
through his ownership of property there. If this connection is not present to a
certain degree, the forum should not accept jurisdiction over the defendant.
However, if this connection is the only one favoring jurisdiction, even if it
exists to a sufficient degree, jurisdiction should also be denied. Thus, no single
factor by itself seems sufficient to support a state court's assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of his interest in property within the state.
IV.

SPECIFIC TYPES OF INTANGIBLES

Different problems for analysis arise in the case of intangibles, because they
normally do not suggest a substantial and continuing contact between the
defendant and the state.' 7 3 Therefore, the interests of the state and the
plaintiff and the inconvenience to the defendant of litigating in a distant
forum take on added importance. Three kinds of intangibles that often had
been the basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction were capital stock, simple debts,
and insurance policies. Each of these will be discussed in light of the new
analysis mandated by Shaffer. It will be shown that capital stock, as in
Shaffer, and simple debts, as in Harris, do not provide sufficient contacts
111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), may permit jurisdiction when these statecontroversy contacts are missing. See notes 240-66 infra and accompanying text.
167. See Smit, supra note 72, at 611-12.
168. Cf. Ownership, supra note 135, at 382 ("lack of permanence of the personalty" Is an
objection to basing jurisdiction on the ownership of intangibles); Smit, supra note 72, at 618, 62 1.
169. Smit, supra note 72, at 612; see discussion of specific types of intangibles in part IV

infra.
170.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945); Developments,

supra note 6, at 966.
171. See generally Smit, supra note 72, at 612.
172. Id.
173. See notes 135-36 supra and accompanying text
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among the defendant and the controversy and the state to withstand the
InternationalShoe analysis. 17 4 The continued viability of the Seider doctrine,
which bases jurisdiction on the attachment of insurance policies, remains
problematic, 175 especially in view of O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.,' 7 6 a
post-Shaffer federal court decision which has upheld the doctrine.
A.

Ownership of Capital Stock

The Shaffer case involved the application of the minimum contacts test to
the ownership of capital stock as a basis for personal jurisdiction. In order to
obtain jurisdiction over the individual defendants, the plaintiff Heitner
availed himself of Delaware's sequestration procedure1 7 7 whereby approximately 82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to nineteen of
the individual defendants, along with stock options belonging to two other
defendants, were "seized." 1 7 8 Although the stock certificates were not actually
present in Delaware, 179 they were subject to seizure pursuant to that state's
corporation law' 8 0 which provides that the ownership of all capital stock in
Delaware corporations has its "situs" there. 1 8 1 The effect of Delaware's
sequestration procedure is to compel the absent defendant's general appearance before the court, thereby subjecting him to full in personam liability. 18z
Commenting on this effect, Justice Marshall said that "if a direct assertion
of personal jurisdiction ... would violate the Constitution, it would seem that
83
an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be equally impermissible.'
He then considered whether the defendant's ownership of stock in Delaware
would support a direct assertion of jurisdiction, assuming arguendo that the
stock's location was there.' 8 4 As to purposefulness, he found that the individ174. See"parts IV (A), (B) infra.
175. See part IV (C) infra.
176. No. 75 C 1853 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1977). But see Torres v. Towmotor, No. 77 C 1810
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1977); Katz v. Umansky, 178 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 28, 1977, at 13. col. 5 (Sup.
CL N.Y. County); Kennedy v. Deroker, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. CL Fulton County 1977).
177. Del. Code tit. 10, § 366 (1975).
178. 97 S.Ct. at 2574.
179. Id.
180. Del. Code tit. 8, § 169 (1975), see note 23 supra.
181. The Delaware stock situs statute is unique in that it overrides Uniform Commercial
Code § 8-317 which requires actual seizure of the stock certificates for any attachment thereof to
be valid.
The Delaware legislature inserted the following language in adopting U.C.C. § 8-317: "(1)
Nothing contained in this subtitle shall repeal, amend or in any way effect [sic) the provisions of
sections 169 and 324, title 8, or sections 365 and 366, and chapter 35, title 10; and to the extent
that any provision of this subtitle is inconsistent with such sections, sections 169 and 324, title 8.
and 365 and 366 and chapter 35, title 10, shall be controlling." Del. Code tit. 6, § 8-317 (1975).
182. 97 S. Ct. at 2583; U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 156 (3d Cir. 1976). ceft.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2972 (1977); see Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 290 A.2d 693,
695 (Del. Ch. 1972).
183. 97 S. Ct. at 2583.
184. Id. at 2585.
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ual defendants did not purposefully situate their stock in Delaware in order to
benefit from that state's laws. On the contrary, they had no choice.185 Nor
could the defendants have had a reasonable expectation of suit in a Delaware
forum. "It strains reason . . . to suggest that anyone buying securities in a

corporation formed in Delaware 'impliedly consents' to subject himself to
Delaware's . . . jurisdiction on any cause of action.' 1 86 In short, the
ownership of capital stock does not evidence a purposeful activity; nor is there
a substantial and continuing relationship with the forum state because, like all
intangibles, corporate securities cannot be said to be "indisputably and
permanently located within a State."' 8 7 Thus, an extension of the Shaffer
reasoning would lead to the conclusion that where the cause of action and the
state have no connection, there is no basis whatever for bringing the nonresident stockholder into court.' 88
In his separate opinion, Justice Brennan conceded that the individual
defendants had no substantial connection with Delaware, but argued that
Delaware had a "substantial interest in providing restitution for its local
corporations that allegedly have been victimized by fiduciary misconduct,"'' 89
especially when the "cause of action centers in an area in which the forum
state possesses a manifest regulatory interest."' 90 He therefore concluded that
fiduciaries of a corporation formed in the state whose law applies to those
fiduciaries' conduct should fairly be subject to that state's jurisdiction. 191
185. Id. (referring to the "statutory presence" of the stock).
186. Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 73 Colum. L.
Rev. 749, 785 (1973), quoted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2586. Justice Stevens noted in his
concurring opinion that "[o]ne who purchases shares of stock on the open market can hardly be
expected to know that he has thereby become subject to uit in a forum remote from his residence
and unrelated to the transaction. As a practical matter, the Delaware Sequestration Statute creates
an unacceptable risk of judgment without notice." 97 S. Ct. at 2587-88 (Stevens, J., concurring).
187. 97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring).
188. See notes 148-62 supra and accompanying text.
189. 97 S. Ct. at 2590 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argued
instead that their relationship with Delaware arose from their positions as corporate fiduciaries of
a Delaware-created corporation. Id. at 2591. Using this relationship as a starting point, he then
applied the principle that "jurisdiction can be based strictly on out-of-state acts having foreseeable effects in the forum state." Id. Justice Brennan had "little difficuly in applying this principle
to nonresident fiduciaries whose alleged breaches of tru;t are said to have substantial damaging
effect on the financial posture of a resident corporation." Id. (footnote omitted). Although a
corporation is deemed a resident of the state only for specific practical purposes, such as diversity
jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970), Justice Brennan argued that it should also be deemed
a resident in a shareholder's derivative action because of the state's "direct interest in guaranteeing the enforcement of its corporate laws, in assuring the solvency and fair management of Its
domestic corporations, and in protecting from fraud those shareholders who placed their faith in
that state-created institution." 97 S. Ct. at 2591 n.4. Here, Justice Brennan would have the
defendants' relationship with the state arise out of the ,.tate's application of its laws and public
policy to this particular type of controversy. Id. at 2592-93.
190. 97 S. Ct. at 2590 (Brennan, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, he
found choice of law to be the primary factor in evaluating jurisdiction.
191. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Marshall countered these arguments by pointing out that Delaware
could have enacted a statute to protect its "interest in securing jurisdiction
over corporate fiduciaries," had it found that interest to be so compelling. 192
Furthermore, he stated, the question of personal jurisdiction is distinct from
choice of law and should be evaluated on the basis of the193defendant's acts
rather than the applicability of a particular state's laws.
Thus, although two factors in favor of jurisdiction-substantial statecontroversy ties stemming from the state's regulatory interest in the proceedings and the defendant shareholders' relationship as corporate fiduciariesexisted in Shaffer, the ownership of capital stock did not constitute a strong
enough basis for jurisdiction. Clearly, where neither of these two factors
exists, ownership of such assets forms yet a weaker basis for jurisdiction.
B. Harris v. Balk and Simple Debts
The majority opinion in Shaffer makes the following statements with
194
respect to Harris v. Balk:
For the type of quasi in rein action typified by Harris v. Balk .

. .

. accepting the

proposed analysis would result in significant. change.
...

For in cases such as Harris... the only role played by the property is to provide

the basis for bringing the defendant into court.. . . In such cases, if a direct assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Constitution, it would seem
that an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be equally impermissible. 19
The factual pattern exemplified by Harris is highly unlikely to tip the scale
in favor of InternationalShoe jurisdiction. 196 In Harris, the plaintiff-in-error
was indebted to Balk who in turn was indebted to Epstein, a resident of
Maryland. Harris and Balk both were North Carolina residents. While Harris
was on a short business trip to Baltimore, Epstein attached Harris' debt to
Balk as a means of obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction over Balk. In the
Maryland action, Harris paid the claim to Epstein. In Balk's subsequent suit
against Harris to collect the debt Harris owed him but had already paid to
Epstein, the Court upheld 197
the jurisdictional validity of the Maryland judgment in favor of Epstein.
The facts reported in Harris indicate that Epstein's claim against Balk had
no connection whatever to Balk's claim against Harris. 98 Furthermore,
Harris did not venture into Maryland at Balk's command, nor is there any
192.

Id.

at 2586.

193. See notes 153-57 supra and accompanying text. Choice of law is only one factor in
determining whether the requisite connection between the state and the controversy exists. See
part HI supra. The defendants' alleged acts which gave rise to the controversy in Shaffer took
place primarily in Oregon. 97 S. Ct. at 2573.
194.
198 U.S. 215 (1905).
195. 97 S. Ct. at 2582-83 (footnote omitted).

196.

See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 178 N.Y.L.J.. Sept. 9, 1977, at 2, col. 2.

197.

198 U.S. at 224, 226.

198.

Id. at 216-17.
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evidence that Balk engaged in any other purposeful activity within the state
of Maryland sufficient to establish any ties with that state. 199 Undoubtedly,
Shaffer's logic should overrule Harris both on its facts and its rationale. The
debt, even if it rode on Harris' back into the state of Maryland, did not ride
there purposefully. 200 Nor did the debt give rise to any other contacts between
the defendant, Balk, and the state. 20 ' The fact that Epstein was a resident of
on
Maryland, in and of itself, is insufficient to show a strong enough interest
20 2
the part of the state to justify subjecting Balk to its jurisdiction.
C. Seider v. Roth and the Attachment of Insurance Policies
The quasi in rem procedure typified by Seider v. Roth 20 3 is peculiar to New
York, Minnesota, and New Hampshire. 20 4 In Seider, New York resident
plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident in Vermont. One of the
defendants, who was a Canadian resident, was insured by the Hartford
Accident Indemnity Company, an insurer doing business in New York.
Plaintiffs obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over the Canadian defendant by
attaching his insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify him. The principal
issue in the case was whether the obligation was an attachable debt 2 ° s under
New York law. 20 6 Once the court found the obligation sufficiently noncontin20 7
gent to fall under the attachment statutes, jurisdiction was upheld.
The Seider doctrine has had a tenuous existence since its inception. One of
the problems recognized early in the doctrine's development was the possibility of increased forum shopping. This problem was addressed in Vaage v.
Lewis, 208 where Norwegian plaintiffs had attempted to bring North Carolina
residents into a New York court in an action arising out of a North Carolina
automobile accident. The court resolved the problem by limiting the availability of the procedure to New York resident plaintiffs on forum non conveniens
grounds. 20 9 This limitation was reaffirmed in subsequent decisions. 210 In
199. Id. See also, Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdictional Motions in New
York, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 374 (1964-65).
200. See notes 130-41 supra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text.
202. See notes 148-62 supra and accompanying text.
203. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
204. Savchuk v. Rush, 245 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976), vacated and remanded for further
considerationin light ofShafferv. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2964 (1977); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H.
617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973).
205. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
206. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5201 (McKinney 1972). The Seider doctrine has been
rejected in many states on the ground that the insurance obligations are too contingent to be
attachable. See, e.g., Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr.
768 (1976) (overruling Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973)). See
also Comment, Javorek v. Superior Court: California Puts Another Nail in the Seider Coffin, 4
W. St. U.L. Rev. 63 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Another Nail].
207. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
208. 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dep't 1968).
209. Id. at 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25.
210. E.g., Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 141, 366 N.E.2d 253, 255, 397 N.Y.S.2d
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addition, a federal district court, in Podolsky v. Devinney,2 1 found in dictum
that the doctrine as originally used would be unconstitutional for its failure to
limit any appearance by the defendant to liability for the face amount of the
policy. This challenge was subsequently resolved by Simpson v. Loeh3
mann,2 12 where the New York Court of Appeals, on reargument,21
reaffirmed its earlier holding that the plaintiff's recovery had to be limited to
the face amount of the policy.2 14 This limitation was designed to preclude
subjecting the
defendant to in personam liability if he appeared to defend on
2 15
the merits.
Another complaint about Seider was that the courts were impermissibly
creating a direct action by judicial fiat when the New York legislature had
failed to enact one. 2 16 The New York courts, however, have consistently
refused to label the Seider procedure a direct action. 21 7 The court in Simpson
addressed this complaint as follows:
The argument that our decision sanctions a "direct action" against the insurer is
sufficiently answered by what we wrote in Seider v. Roth ...: "It is said that by
affirmance here we would be setting up a 'direct action' against the insurer. That is
true to the extent only that affirmance will put jurisdiction in New York State and
require the insurer to defend here, not because a debt owing by it to the defendant has
been attached but because by its policy it has agreed to defend in any place where

jurisdiction is obtained against its insured."21 8

It is true that direct actions have survived constitutional scrutiny, 21 9 but there
is a significant difference between the Seider doctrine and the typical direct
action. The Louisiana direct action statute 220 is typical of the majority in that
it is available only when the accident happened in Louisiana. In fact, an
insurer may be sued directly in Louisiana, even if it has no contacts there
other than "its presence on the risk at the time of the accident," and even if
the insured motorist is a nonresident, provided that the accident took place
within the state. 22' The Rhode Island statute,2 22 moreover, applies only when
592, 594 (1977); Reisner v. James, 178 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1977, at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County).
211. 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
212. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
213. 21 N.Y.2d 990, 990-91, 238 N.E.2d 319, 319-20, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915-16 (1968).
214. 21 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37.
215. Id.
216. See Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 149, 366 N.E.2d 253, 260, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592,
600 (1977) (Jasen, J., concurring); .Governor's Veto Message, 1973 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 349.
217. Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 147, 366 N.E.2d 253, 259, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 598
(1977) (Jasen, J., concurring); see Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269
N.Y.S.2d at 102; Torres v. Towmotor, No. 77 C 1810 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1977), slip op. at
20-23.
218. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 671-72, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (emphasis added).
219. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
220. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (West Supp. 1977). See also, P.R. Laws Ann tit. 26, §§
2001, 2003(1) (1958 & Supp. 1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 803.04(2) (West 1977).
221. Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 155, 158 (E.D. La. 1958).
222. RLI. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2 (Supp. 1976).
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the insured cannot be served and the policy had been issued in Rhode
Island. 223 Both statutes permit direct actions only in cases where long-arm
jurisdiction can also be obtained over the defendant-insured. 224 In the usual
Seider fact pattern, on the other hand, the accident occurs out of state;225 the
forum state's law usually does not apply;226 and the forum is not the only one
available to the plaintiff. 227 Thus, Seider clearly cannot be called a direct

action of the kind upheld in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance
an
Corp.228 In fact, the New York courts have consistently justified Seider as
the insured. 229 If

action in which quasi in rem jurisdiction is obtained over
the doctrine is to be viewed in this way, it is necessary to examine the contacts
between the defendant-insured and the state.
One argument for finding sufficient contacts between the named defendant
and the state is that the insurance obligation is so bound up with the
controversy that the action becomes a quasi in rem action of the first type
described in Hanson, 230 in which the cause of action arises out of the property
attached. The problem with this argument is that it plays too heavily on the
"bootstrap" 23 1 technique used by the Seider court to find the obligation
noncontingent and therefore attachable. 232 The obligation to defend and
indemnify does not become "property" until an action has been commenced,
233
but no valid action can be commenced without adequate jurisdiction.
Another serious problem with this argument is the fact that the "location" of
the "property" is wholly adventitious;

234

the nonresident defendant-insured is

not interested in where his insurer does business, nor should he have to
inquire when purchasing the policy. 235 This certainly does not constitute

purposeful activity on the part of the defendant sufficient to tie him to the
state for jurisdictional purposes. 236 Thus, in light of the principles set forth in
Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 48 R.I. 433, 138 A. 186 (1927).
224. See statutes cited note 276 infra.
225. See notes 203-07 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 152-57 supra and accompanying text. But see Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.Zd
438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Tjepkemat v. Kenney, 31 App. Dlv. 2d 908, 298
N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't 1969).
227. See notes 158-62 supra and accompanying text.
228. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
229. See notes 217-18 supra and accompanying text.
230. 357 U.S. at 246 n. 12; see Cohen, Letter to the Editor, 178 N.Y.L.J., Aug, 19, 1977, at
2, col. 6. But see Pieper, Letter to the Editor, 178 N Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1977, at 2, col. 6.
231. Seigel, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5201, at 76 (McKinney Supp.
1976).
232. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (Burke, J., dissenting) ("circular
ratiocination').
233. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Javorek v. Superior
Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 634, 552 P.2d 728, 733, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768, 773 (1976).
234. Torres v. Towmotor, No. 77 C 1810 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1977), slip op. at 34; Kennedy
v. Deroker, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977); Another Nail, supra note 206,
at 82.
235. See notes 142-47 supra and accompanying text.
236. See notes 130-41 supra and accompanying text.
223.
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Shaffer, jurisdiction under the Seider doctrine cannot be upheld if it is
analyzed as an action based on quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant
insured.
It appears that the doctrine can be sustained, if at all, only when the
plaintiff is a New York resident and the procedure is regarded as sui generis,
albeit akin to a direct action. 237 As such, only the plaintiff and the insurer are
considered to be the real parties in interest, and the insurance proceeds are
recognized as the real object of the litigation. 238 This is precisely the view of
Seider taken in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.2 39 Under this view of the
doctrine-that is, as neither a true direct action2 40 nor a true quasi in rem
action 24 '-the insurer's role as the real defendant in interest and the plaintiffs
interest in conducting the litigation in his home forum become the important
factors in the due process analysis. The role of the insured is minimized since
the procedure may protect him from prejudice to the extent that he has an
interest in the litigation beyond his participation as a mere witness.242
However, as will be shown, the state-controversy ties, even under this view,
2 43
are ordinarily too tenuous to support jurisdiction in a Seider based-action.
Although the Seider doctrine has never expressly been called a direct
action, 244 this view of it does coincide with the New York Court of Appeals'
recognition in Simpson 245 that the insurer is the real defendant in interest:
Viewed realistically, the insurer in a case such as the present is in full control of the
litigation; it selects the defendant's attorneys; it decides if and when to settle; and it
makes all procedural decisions in connection with the litigation.... Moreover, where
the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state and the insurer is present in and regulated
by it, the State has a substantial and continuing relation with the controversy. For
and in
jurisdictional purposes, in assessing fairness under the due process clause
24 6
determining the public policy of New York, such factors loom large.
In O'Connor, this language was interpreted to mean that the court in Simpson
found the InternationalShoe standard to have been met.2 47 In addition, as
the Simpson court noted, the fact that the insurer does business in the state
and that it has " 'agreed to defend in any place where jurisdiction is
obtained against its insured,' "248 lends substantial support to the fairness of
237. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., No. 75 C 1853, slip op. at 22-23 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
27, 1977).
238. Id. at 23.
239. Id. However, this view was rejected in Torres v. Towmotor, No. 77 C 1810 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1977), slip op. at 20.
240. See notes 220-27 supra and accompanying text.
241. No. 75 C 1853, slip op. at 22-23.
242. Id. at 23.
243. See notes 258-66 infra and accompanying text.
244. See notes 216-18 supra and accompanying text.
245. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
246. Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (citation omitted).
247. No. 75 C 1853, slip op. at 13-14.
248. 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (quoting Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102).
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requiring the insurer to appear on the named defendant's behalf. 249 Insofar as
the insurer is concerned, were it the named defendant, in personam jurisdiction over it would undoubtedly be consistent with the InternationalShoe test.
To the extent that the named-defendant insured has an interest in the
litigation, under the non-quasi in rem analysis, he may be deemed to be
protected such that the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
are not offended. 2-0 Because the plaintiffs recovery presumably will continue
to be limited to the face amount of the policy, the named-defendant runs no
risk of being subject to in personam liability for damages in excess of those
paid by the insurer. 2-' In addition, "the [Seider] procedure may not be used
as the means of obtaining a preference in the distribution of inadequate
coverage in cases involving multiple claims and claimants ' '25 2 so as to exhaust
the defendant's coverage upon adjudication of the first claim and subject him
to personal liability in a subsequent suit. Should any such danger arise, the
various actions should be consolidated in a forum that has sufficient contacts
with the insured since, in all likelihood, he will incur a personal obligation
beyond the amount of insurance indemnification, if he is found liable at all.
Thus, if all of the interests of the insured are protected, an evaluation of his
'253
contacts with the state may be "beside
because his only role in
25 4 the point,
witness.
a
of
that
is
litigation
the
If Shaffer requires the removal of all labels, including those relating to the
parties, and an assessment and balancing of the relative interests of the real
parties, this evaluation of the state-defendant contacts weighs heavily in favor
of finding jurisdiction. It is not entirely clear that Shaffer does require this
approach, however, for it never expressly adopted the interest-balancing test
proposed by many of the commentators. 25- Still, the fact that Shffer cited
256
those commentators, as well as decisions like Atkinson v. Superior Court,
with approval 25 7 suggests that this type of analysis is what the Court had in
mind.
On the other hand, the state-controversy connection in O'Connor and all
other Seider actions appears to be insufficient to meet the Shaffer test. One
argument for finding a sufficient state-controversy contact relies on the
injured resident plaintiffs or, if a wrongful death action, the surviving
249. Id.; O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., No. 75 C 1853, slip op. at 23-27.
250. See No. 75 C 1853, slip op. at 26-27.
251. See notes 213-15 supra and accompanying text.
252. No. 75 C 1853, slip op. at 26.
253. Id. at 23.
254. Id. One possible criticism of this analysis is that the insurer may disclaim liability and
expose the insured to personal liability if, for example, the insured fails to cooperate. Torres v.
Towmotor, No. 77 C 1810 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1977). slip op. at 31, 44 n.14.
255. See Smit, supra note 72, at 614; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1165;
Developments, supra note 6, at 956.
256. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), discussed at notes 82-85
supra and accompanying text.
257. 97 S. Ct. at 2580-81.
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spouse's interest in conducting the litigation in his home court.25, This
argument finds support both in Simpson259 and in Watson,26 0 where the
state's interest in providing redress to its injured residents was found to be a
sufficient state-controversy contact. However, if Seider is to be analyzed
anew as a judicially created quasi direct action, it should be noted that "no
direct action statute presently in existence permits a direct action against the
insurer based on the minimum contacts suggested [in Simpson].12 '6 As noted
above, the direct action statutes that have been upheld require either that the
tort occur within the forum state262 or that the insurance policy be issued in
the state. 26 3 As such, these statutes guarantee a substantial connection
between the state and the controversy because the state's law normally applies
either to the issue of tort liability or to the construction of the insurance

264
contract. Seider actions, on the other hand, ordinarily lack these features.
The weakness of the state-controversy contact existing in Seider-based
actions is a thorny problem that will disappear only if one of two alternatives
occurs-if Seider is overruled as a constitutionally defective remnant of quasi
in rem jurisdiction, 265 or if Seider is replaced by a legislatively created direct

action statute that limits availability of the action to cases in which the
26 6
accident occurred, or the insurance policy was issued, within the state.
V.

A.

FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

Shaffer's Effect on State Statutes

Some states have codified the pre-Shaffer quasi in rem attachment procedure 267 to confer jurisdiction over the defendant's interest in property in the
258. No. 75 C 1853, slipop. at 8.
259. 21 N.Y.2d at 312-13, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638-39 (Keating, J.,
concurring).
260. 348 U.S. at 72.
261. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 497 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
262. See notes 220-21 supra and accompanying text.
263. See notes 222-23 supra and accompanying text.
264. See notes 225-27 supra and accompanying text. Despite the absence of these contacts
between the forum and the controversy, however, the New York Court of Appeals found that
"the State has a substantial and continuing relation with the controversy." Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 6772, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
265. See notes 230-36 supra and accompanying text.
266. See notes 220-23 supra and accompanying text. Here it should be noted that Judge
Friendly, in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 844 (1969), read Watson to mean that "the Supreme Court
would sustain the validity of a state statute permitting direct actions against insurers doing
business in the state in favor of residents as well as on behalf of persons injured within it." Id. at
110.
267. See Ala. Code tit. 6, § 6-41 (1975); Del. Code tit. 10, § 3506 (1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
49.011 (West Supp. 1977); Ga. Code Ann. § 81A-104 (1972 & Supp. 1977); Idaho Code § 8-501(2)
(Supp. 1977); Ind. R. Tr. Prac. 4.9 (Burns 1973); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-307 (1976); La. Code Civ.
Pro. Ann. art. 9 (West 1960); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 504 (1964); Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(2) (West
1968); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-19 (1972); Mo. Rev. StaL § 506.160 (1959); Mont. R. Civ. P. 4D(5)
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state to the extent of that interest. 268 Like the Delaware sequestration
statute 269 these statutes appear to be unconstitutional on their face because
they base jurisdiction solely on the presence of property in the state without
requiring more in the way of contacts among the defendant, the litigation and
the forum. 270 As such they "allow state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant."12 7 ' Other state quasi in rem procedures are
tacitly embodied in state attachment statutes which permit attachment on a
272
number of enumerated grounds, including the nonresidence of a defendant.
Such statutes are not necessarily unconstitutional. First, they do not expressly
provide for jurisdiction on the basis of attachment. Second, they may be
judicially construed to apply only when attachment is sought for purposes of
2 73

securing a potential judgment.

Despite the apparent unconstitutionality of many current state quasi in rem
procedures, the considerations set forth in Shaffer and in part III of this
Comment provide a justification for extending the reach of the state long-arm
statutes on the basis of property present within the forum state. Under the
line of cases beginning with InternationalShoe and ending with Shaffer and
O'Connor, purposeful, substantial, and continuing contacts between the defendant and the state and a valid state interest in the controversy will
substantiate jurisdiction
even when the cause of action is unrelated to the
274
defendant's contacts.

For the few states whose long-arm statutes are phrased in the most general
terms, providing for "jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of [the] state or of the United States, ' 275 no drafting changes are
necessary to encompass the ramifications of the Shaffer holding. The majority
(Supp. 1975); Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (1973); N.J. Ct. R. Ann. 4:4-5 (West Supp. 1977); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-75.8 (1969); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 170.1, .8 (West Supp. 1976-77); Or. Rev. Stat. §
29.140 (1975); R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-5-6 (1969); S.C. Code § 15-9-710 (1976); S.D. Compiled Laws
Ann. § 15-9-14 (1967); Vt. R. Civ. & App. P. 4(e)(2) (1971). Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.100 (1962);
W. Va. Code § 56-3-23 (1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 801.07 (West 1977); Wyo. Stat. § 1-265 (1957).
268.- N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 314 (McKinney 1972) provides a useful example. It reads in
pertinent part: "Service without the state not giving personal jurisdiction in certain actions...
Service may be made without the state ... where a levy upon property of the person to be served
has been made within the state pursuant to an order of attachment or a chattel of such person has
been seized in an action to recover a chattel." Id.
269. See note 106 supra.
270. 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
271. Id. at 2584.
272. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 31-101 (1962); Colo. R. Civ. P. 102 (Supp. 1976); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 26-1-1 (1954). But see, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.40.010 (1973) (attachment for security
purposes).
273. See notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
274. See part III supra.
275. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 1973); see Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a)(2)(I) (1977); Alaska
Stat. § 09.05.015 (1973); Iowa R. Civ. P. 56.2 (West Supp. 1977-78); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14,
§ 704-A(5) (West Supp. 1976-77); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-539 (1975); N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(2)(H)
(Supp. 1977); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-5-33 (1970); Vt. R. Civ. & App. P. 4(e)(1) (1971); Va. Code §
8.01-330 (1977).
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of state long-arm statutes, however, impose the requirement that the cause of

action arise out of the contacts enumerated in the statute.2 76 Under Shaffer's
reasoning, this requirement is not always necessary. The argument may be
raised that the Shaffer standard is too uncertain 27 7 to be translated into
codified form. However, the broad language of a statute like California's 7 8
seems to provide both the reach and the flexibility to meet post-Shqffer
requirements. The California courts, moreover, seem to have had little
trouble in applying the InternationalShoe-Shaffer standard3.79 Perhaps, as
case law develops on the heels of Shaffer to show that jurisdiction can, and in
some cases must, be evaluated without strict enumeration of the necessary
contacts, 280 other states will follow California's lead.
B. Surviving Doctrines of Jurisdiction
Despite the fact that Shaffer has mandated that the minimum contacts
standard be applied to "all assertions of state court jurisdiction, ' 28' certain
jurisdictional doctrines not discussed in the case are likely to survive. Among
28 2
those are "the particularized rules governing adjudications of status,"
which the Court apparently considers not "inconsistent with the standard of
fairness. '28 3 Thus, the Court does not intend to restrict the ability to obtain a
foreign ex parte divorce. Nevertheless, the continuation of the Williams v.
276. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) (West 1973); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-339.1, -340 (1962 & Supp.
1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-59b (West Supp. 1977); Del.
Code tit. 10, § 3104 (1975); D.C. Code Encycl. § 13423 (West Supp. 1970); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
48.193 (West Supp. 1977); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-113.1 (1971); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634-35 (Supp.
1974); Idaho Code § 5-514 (Supp. 1977); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (Civil Practice Act. § 17)
(Smith-Hurd 1968); Ind. R. Tr. P. 4.4 (Bums 1973); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-308(b) (1976); Ky. R,
Civ. P. 4.04(8) (Supp. 1977); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3201 (West 1968); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann. § 6-103 (1974); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 223A, § 3 (MichielLaw. Co-op Supp. 1977);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.705 (Supp. 1977-78); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-57 (1972); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 506.500 (Vernon Supp. 1977); Mont. R. Civ. P. 4B(1) (Supp. 1975); Nev. Re'. Stat. §
14.065 (1973); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510:4 (Supp. 1975); N.J. Ct. R. Ann. 4:4-4 (West Supp.
1977); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302 (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1976-77); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (1969); N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(b) (Supp. 1977); Ohio R. Civ.
P. 4.3 (Anderson Supp. 1976); Okla. Stat Ann. tit. 12, § 187 (West Supp. 1976-77); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 14.035 (1975); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 296, 331 (Purdon 1953 & Supp. 1977-78); S.C. Code §§
15-9-350, -360, -370, -390 (1976); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 15-7-2 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann. §
20-235 (Supp. 1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 203lb (Vernon 1964); Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-24, -26 (1977); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.28.185 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 Wash.
Legis. Serv. ch. 39 (No. 1, Reg. Sess.); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 801.05 (West 1977).
277. See Developments, supra note 6, at 950.
278. See note 275 supra and accompanying text.
279. See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied sub noma.Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958);
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 657 (1959).
280. See notes 81-85 supra and accompanying text.
281. 97 S. CL at 2584.
282. Id. at 2582 n.30.
283. Id.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

490

[Vol. 46

North Carolina28 4 rule, that an ex parte foreign divorce is valid if the plaintiff
spouse has established a bona fide domicile in the forum state, 28 seems to
defy the logic of Shaffer. "[Ilt seems extremely unfair and unjust . . . to
impose upon the defendant spouse the unpalatable option either of appearing
in the action to contest the merits, very likely at great expense and inconvenience, or of suffering an uncontested default judgment destroying completely
the marital relation. ' 286 28It7 appears, however, that for practical reasons, this
rule will go unscathed.
Another traditional doctrine that may survive Shaffer is the rule that
personal service upon a defendant within the state confers personal jurisdiction consistent with InternationalShoe.288 Again, it seems entirely unfair that
a defendant who has no contacts whatever with a state may be subjected to
full personal liability in one of that state's courts merely because he happens to
be vacationing there. 28 9 'This question is one which the Shaffer Court did not
address. Whether state courts will deny jurisdiction based only on personal
service within the state, without additional contacts between the defendant and
the state, remains for future determination. However, it seems that physical
presence within the state which suggests no other contacts, such as residence
or the transaction of business, should not support jurisdiction
when the
29 0
controversy has no relation to the defendant's presence.
Since the Shaffer Court declined to address these problems,2 9 1 they are
unlikely to be brought into line soon with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. However, the Court has taken at least a significant step in
that direction by recognizing that other jurisdictional 29doctrines
may work
2
fundamental unfairness to the nonresident defendant.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Shaffer has been long awaited. 293 Some may
question whether the Court needed to go as far as it did. 294 Although the
284.

317 U.S. 287 (1942) ("Williams I").

285. Id. at 303. But the divorce judgment may still be open to attack elsewhere, to the extent
that the judgment is open to direct or collateral attack in the rendering state, if that state lacked
personal jurisdiction over the defendant spouse. See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587,
589 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226, 229 (1945) ("Williams IrF).
286. Developments, supra note 6, at 973.
287. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.30. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex. L. Rev.
657, 661 (1959) ("In any event, a defendant's purposeless interest in barricading the plaintiff's
avenue to freedom is overwhelmingly outweighed by the plaintiff's purposeful interest in securing
freedom.")
288. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316. The Court expressly excepted
the defendant's presence "within the territory of the forum" from the minimum contacts test. Id.
289. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 14, at 312.
290. See Developments, supra note 6, at 939.
291. See 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.30.
292.

Id.

293.

In 1957, Justice Traynor presaged the wider application of the InternationalShoe rule in

at 2584.
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Delaware sequestration statute is "unconstitutional on its face"29 S for allowing the imposition of full personal liability on a nonresident defendant solely
on the basis of his ownership of some property located in the state, the Court
might have cured the statute's defects by requiring that it be accompanied by
limited appearance and preseizure notice and hearing.2 96 Such a holding,
however, would have served only to continue the stretching and pulling at
Pennoyer v. Neff that has occurred for nearly one hundred years. The Shaffer
decision quite correctly decided to reverse this direction in the realization that
"fair play and substantial justice" can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of
ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage .... The fiction that
an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction
over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modem
to allow state court jurisdicjustification. Its continued acceptance would serve only
297
tion that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.

No longer can the nonresident be compelled to defend an action in a
foreign and inconvenient state where he happens to own some property,
unless that ownership has a purposeful, substantial, and continuing character.
Those commentators who have espoused the unconstitutionality of quasi in
rem jurisdiction for many years may find great comfort in Shaffer. And for
those who find some utility in the old rules, all is not lost, for the presence of
some types of property within a particular state may constitutionally provide
the plaintiff with the ability to subject nonresident defendants to full personal
liability in the plaintiff's home court.

Suzanne T. Marquard
Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958). Commentators since 1960 have urged the expansion of the "fair play" doctrine into in rem and quasi in
rem actions. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 6.
294. "My uncertainty as to the reach of the opinion, and my fear that it purports to decide a
great deal more than is necessary ... persuade me merely to concur in the judgment." 97 S. CL
at 2588 (Stevens, J., concurring).
295. Id.
296. See note 24 supra.
297. 97 S. Ct. at 2584 (citations omitted).

